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Bargaining and market power in a GIS-based hedonic pricing model of the agricultural 
land market 
 
Geerte Cotteleer and Cornelis Gardebroek 
 
Abstract 
Agricultural land markets differ greatly from the textbook-case of perfect competition. This is 
why standard hedonic pricing techniques should be revised before applying this technique to 
this market. The objective of this paper is to determine (a) the deviation from the competitive 
market price of agricultural land in the Netherlands due to market power and the existence of 
an excess surplus and (b) the effect of bargaining power on the division of excess surplus 
between the eventual seller and the buyer in the market for agricultural land. 
 





Agricultural land markets differ greatly from the textbook-case of perfect competition. This is 
due to specific characteristics of the land market and land itself. Land is heterogeneous and 
cannot be relocated, and the market is to a great extent local and thin. This means there are 
few buyers and sellers and mostly neighboring farmers are buyers, leading to bargaining and 
market power effects. Excess surplus is created on the property market because, in a thin 
market, there is not much entry and exit, so surpluses are not eliminated. This means market 
power determines the size and the direction of the excess surplus, with the final buyer and   2 
seller of land having to bargain over how the excess surplus is divided between them. Thus, 
the  price  on  the  land  market  is  both  influenced  by  relative  market  power  and  relative 
bargaining  power.  Bargaining  and  market  power  in  the  local  land  market  are  explicitly 
modeled in this paper using a hedonic pricing model. 
  The reason why this paper focuses on local market conditions is that for some decades 
already, the structure of the agricultural sector in The Netherlands is changing. The average 
farm size is growing as the number of farms declines. Because farms need to scale-up in order 
to stay in business, they also need to extend their area. This results in transactions of land 
between farms located near each other. So, local market conditions are expected to play an 
important role in the land market motivating our emphasis on market and bargaining power in 
agricultural land markets.  
In this paper we focus on part of the total land market, i.e. the market for agricultural 
land. It is clear that in a densely populated country like The Netherlands the land market for 
agriculture interacts with markets for industrial land use, housing and other land uses. But as 
Shonkwiler and Reynolds (1986) point out, hedonic pricing models require that products be 
purchased  for  the  same  use  by  different  customers.  So,  market  segmentation  has  to  be 
introduced  to  account  for  the  fact  that  parcels  with  different  uses  have  different  shadow 
prices.  We  therefore  only  take  transactions  of  land  into  account  that  have  a  farming 
destination after sale. Of the 55451 parcels in the database
1 that were sold in 2003 about 71% 
were either bought by a farmer, or subsequently used for agricultural purposes or both. This 
high proportion indicates that the market for agricultural land plays an important role in rural 
areas in The Netherlands, which makes it an interesting market to analyze.  
                                                 
1  This  database  contains  all  transactions  that  are  of  interest  to  Government  Services  for  Land  and  Water 
Management (DLG) in The Netherlands. These are parcels with a green purpose. Included in green purposes are: 
agriculture, nature and recreation. For example farm land sold to the municipality for industrial purposes is 
included in this database, whereas housing transactions are not.    3 
The objective, therefore, is to determine (a) the deviation from the competitive market 
price of agricultural land in the Netherlands due to market power and the existence of an 
excess surplus, and (b) the effect of bargaining power on how the excess surplus is divided 
between the seller and the eventual buyer. Therefore, a hedonic pricing model that allows for 
bargaining power and market power is discussed in the next section. Specific attention is 
given  to  the  origins  and  division  of  the  excess  surplus  in  a  market  under  imperfect 
competition. The third section discusses the empirical specification of the model, including 
the functional form, the estimation procedure and the estimation of the number of sellers and 
buyers in the local market. An overview of our GIS database and additional data sources is 
provided  in  section  four,  while  the  empirical  results  are  provided  in  section  five.  Final 
conclusions and policy implications ensue.  
 
Theoretical model 
First introduced by Rosen (1974), hedonic pricing is often used to model prices in property 
markets. Models assume that implicit prices of property characteristics can be revealed from 
observed prices of heterogeneous properties and the specific characteristics associated with 
them. Furthermore, in these models, the marginal WTP is equal to the marginal WTA, and 
equals the marginal price of the characteristic. It is assumed that they are not only equal, but 
they also intersect, because there is free entry and exit in the market, so no excess surpluses 
exist. This situation is shown in figure 1. For values Xi* and Xi** of a particular characteristic 
i the slopes of the bid (￿1 and ￿2) and offer (￿1 and ￿2) curves are equal, and they also 
intersect. Furthermore, P is the hedonic price function
2
.  
                                                 
2 This linear representation of the hedonic price function is a simplification of the actual hedonic price function.   4 
 
Figure 1: Hedonic pricing model without excess surplus 
 
A drawback of these original hedonic pricing models is that they do not take the influence of 
bargaining and market power into account. In fact, standard hedonic pricing theory assumes 
perfect competition in explaining transaction prices. However, markets become increasingly 
thin when traded goods are heterogeneous. In a thin market there is not enough entry and exit 
to drive the market to equilibrium. In situations with perfect competition, equilibrium sales 
would take place at the point where the marginal WTP is equal to the marginal WTA and 
there would not be an excess surplus. But because of a limited number of participants in local 
land markets, there is no entry of prospective buyers with downward-shifted bid functions or 
entry of prospective sellers with upward-shifted offer functions. This means that there remains 
an excess surplus over which buyers and sellers can bargain.  
  King  and  Sinden  (1994)  introduced  bargaining  in  hedonic  pricing  models.  They 
determined the excess surplus over which buyers and sellers could bargain through additional 
survey information about the maximum willingness to pay (WTP) of buyers and made some 
additional  assumptions  on  the  minimum  willingness  to  accept  (WTA)  of  sellers.  The 
bargaining  power  can  then  be  determined  by  relating  the  actual  price  paid  to  the  excess 
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does  not  work.  Harding  et  al.  (2003)  extended  the  hedonic  pricing  theory  by  explicitly 
allowing for bargaining power. In their empirical application on the market for houses they 
estimated the bargaining power directly from the characteristics of the buyers and sellers. But 
Harding et al. (2003) simply state that an excess surplus exists and do not put any effort into 
defining the size and the direction of the excess surplus.  
The excess surplus in Harding et al. (2003) is given in figure 2. At the point X1* and 
X1** the slopes of the bid and offer curves are equal. So, marginal benefits equal marginal 
costs, but yet there is a surplus. The positive surplus is divided between the buyer and the 
seller, depending on the bargaining power of each of the two.  
 
Figure 2: Excess surplus (Harding, et al., 2003) 
 
Harding et al. (2003) assume that compared to the hedonic price function the excess surplus is 
evenly spread over the eventual buyer and the seller and that bargaining power causes a 
parallel  shift  in  the  hedonic  pricing  function.  However,  the  question  is  how  one  can  say 
anything  about  bargaining  power  if  one  doesn’t  know  the  excess  surplus.  One  needs  an 
estimate of the excess surplus in order to derive the bargaining power.  
In this paper it is assumed that the direction of the excess surplus is determined by the 
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the bigger the chance that there are buyers who are WTP more (shifting bid-curves up). The 
same argument holds for the sellers: more sellers results in less market power and a greater 
chance that some sellers are WTA less (shifting offer curves down). Thus, the excess surplus 
depends  on  the  relative  number  of  potential  buyers  and  sellers  in  the  local  land  market.  
Figure 3 shows this.  
 
 
Figure 3: Excess surplus in this paper  
 
Without knowing the maximum WTP and the minimum WTA of the eventual buyer and 
seller it is not possible to determine the exact size and magnitude of the excess surplus. We 
estimate the deviation from the hedonic price function due to market power as the average of 
the bid and the offer curves at the point where the marginal WTP is equal to the marginal 
WTA. This deviation from the competitive market price is determined by the relative market 
power.  
This is an extension of the Cournot model, which assumes that an increase in the 
number of competing sellers decreases the price. The competitive market price in the Cournot 
model is only attained if the number of sellers grows infinitely large. Stiglitz (1987) argues 
that the Cournot model does not necessarily hold if search costs are involved. A decrease in 
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decrease. However, we assume these search costs play no role because markets are defined 
locally and all potential buyers and sellers can find each other easily.  
Similar to Harding et al. (2003), it is assumed that bargaining causes parallel shifts in 
the  hedonic  pricing  function.  The  same  is  assumed  for  market  power.  This  means  that 
attribute shadow prices are assumed unaffected by the bargaining process and the market 
form.  Harding  et  al.  (2003)  tested  whether  the  shadow  prices  were  influenced  by  the 
occupancy status of the house (this variable was used as an indicator of the bargaining power) 
finding that the assumption of a constant shift is a reasonable approximation.  
Assume the hedonic price function takes the following linear form: 
 
P = s1X1 + s2X2 +…+ snXn + M + B = sX + M + B  (1) 
 
where P is the price of the properties traded on the thin local market and s denotes the shadow 
prices of the property characteristics. X are all characteristics of the property, M is the market 
power  (determining  the  direction  of  the  excess  surplus)  and  B  is  the  eventual  bargaining 
power. Replace M in equation (1) by its proxy N and an error term:  
 
P = sX + aN + ea + B  (2) 
 
where a is the coefficient of the proxy for market power and ea is the associated error term so 
that M = N + ea.  B is described in the same way as in Harding, et al. (2003) - as a function of 






buy + eb  (3) 
   8 
This leads to 
 




buy + eb  (4) 
 
Furthermore, assume that sX exists of an observed part; s
OX
O, and an unobserved part; s
UX
U. 
This  unobserved  or  omitted  variables  part  could  be  correlated  with  the  characteristics  of 
sellers and buyers, which means that people with certain characteristics value unobserved 
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Where ￿ = ea + eb + ed. This leaves us with an identification problem, which can be solved by 
assuming  that  the  unobserved  attributes  are  not  correlated  with  the  characteristics  of  the 
buyers and sellers. This implies that d
sell and d
buy are 0. An alternative is to assume (Harding 
et al., 2003): 
-  symmetric bargaining power   ￿  b
sell = -b
buy 
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In  this  paper  we  assume  that  the  unobserved  attributes  are  not  correlated  with  the 
characteristics of buyers and sellers, rather than assuming symmetric bargaining power and 
symmetric demand. In section five, about the empirical results, we will ground this decision.  
       
Empirical specification   
Several empirical issues arise in the estimation of a hedonic pricing function. First, we have to 
define a proxy variable for market power. Market power is defined in the following way: N = 
(NAS – NAB) / (NAS + NAB), where NAS and NAB are the number of actual sellers and 
buyers, respectively, in the local markets during the last five years. This measure also takes 
the dynamics of the land market over time into account. To calculate N two steps have to be 
taken. First, we need to determine what a local market is. In this research local markets are 
defined by the distribution of the distances between the location of the buyers and the location 
of the parcel that is sold to them. From this distribution the distance that corresponds with the 
90th percentile is chosen as the radius of the local market. The maximum distance is not 
chosen in order to ignore outliers. Based on our data, we find that 90% of the agricultural 
buyers that are not located in urban areas are located within 6.7 km of the parcels they bought 
(see table 1). This measure of distance is used to define local markets around each parcel sold.   
 
Table 1: Distance between buyers and the parcels they buy 
Percentage of buyers located within the given distance  Distance in meters  
50%  642.43 
80%  2639.12 
90%  6696.57 
95%  17282.21 
100%  205840.70   10 
 
Second, the number of buyers and sellers in the local market has to be determined. It is 
assumed that all sellers were able to sell their land, with no potential sellers unable to sell 
land. In other words, the number of sellers in the market is equal to the observed number of 
sellers. To determine the number of buyers we cannot make this assumption. It is plausible 
that potential buyers did not obtain land within the local market, e.g. because their bid was too 
low. However, if there are more potential buyers than plots of land for sale within a local 
market,  it  can  be  expected  that  some  buyers  bought  land  on  another  local  land  market. 
Therefore, the number of actual sellers and actual buyers may be different within a local 
market. If the number of sellers equals the number of buyers within a given local market, N 
equals zero. With more sellers than buyers within a local market (buyers from other local 
markets buy the offered land), N is positive and if there are more buyers than sellers, N is 
negative.  
A second specification issue is the choice of the functional form. According to Taylor 
(2003) little theoretical guidance exists for the choice of functional form. One approach could 
be  to  use  Box-Cox  transformations  that  take  the  double-log,  semi-log  and  several  other 
functional forms as special cases, and choose the functional form based on goodness-of-fit 
criteria.  According  to  Cassel  and  Mendelsohn  (1985),  using  best-fit-criteria  does  not 
necessarily lead to more accurate estimates of characteristic prices. Rasmussen and Zuehlke 
(1990)  state  that  the  introduction  of  empirically  unnecessary  non-linearities  may  ‘over-
parameterize’ the problem, resulting in less precise point estimates. Cropper et al. (1988) used 
simulations to find that, when some variables are not observed and proxies are used, simple 
models (such as linear or double-log) perform best. Based on these findings and because we 
have many parameters to estimate (due to the high number of explanatory variables), we use a 
simple linear functional form, with transformations on some explanatory variables.    11 
An issue in estimation concerns spatial autocorrelation. Whereas autocorrelation is 
mostly associated with time-series and panel data, geographical cross-section data can also be 
subject to autocorrelation. Autocorrelation occurs when the spatial variables do not accurately 
reflect  the  underlying  spatial  processes.  Spatial  autocorrelation  is  sometimes  called  error 
dependence, or  0 ) , ( ¹ j i Corr e e . In the presence of spatial error-dependence, the traditional 
hedonic price function can be re-specified to include a spatially autoregressive process in the 








buy + ￿,  (8) 
 
where ￿ = ￿W￿ + ￿ and ￿ ~ N(0, ￿
2I) 
 
Here W is the spatial weighting matrix containing the spatial weights. These weights are 
specified a priori between all pairs of observations. If observations are microlevel agents, each 
element  of  the  spatial  weighting  matrix  (wij),  weights  the  degree  of  spatial  dependence 
according to the distance or proximity between observations i and j (Bell and Bockstael, 
2000).  








buy + (I – ￿W)
-1￿  ( 9) 
 
Spatial autocorrelation is tested for using several test-statistics. First of all Moran’s I statistic, 
derived from a statistic developed by Moran (1948), secondly the Lagrange Multiplier test 
(LM-err) suggested by Burridge (1980) and thirdly the test of Kelejian and Robinson (1992) 
(KR).  In  order  to  use  the  first  two  test  statistics  the  spatial  weighting  matrix  has  to  be   12 
specified a priori. The Kelejian and Robinson test has as an advantage that it doesn’t require 
this a priori specification of the spatial weighting matrix.  
Beside spatial autocorrelation, also spatial lag dependence can play a role in spatial 
models. In the presence of spatial lag-dependence the hedonic pricing function can be re-
specified in the following way: 
 
P = ￿WP +  s
OX




buy + ￿,  (10) 
 
  The appearance of spatial lag dependence is tested using the SARMA test statistic 
(Anselin, 1988), which is a Lagrange Multiplier test.  
If  spatial  autocorrelation  is  present  it  can  be  taken  into  account  using  the  spatial 
Generalized  Method  of  Moments  (GMM)  estimator  of  Kelejian  and  Prucha  (1999).  The 
advantage of this GMM-estimator is that the calculation of the estimator, even for extremely 
large sample sizes is still quite straightforward. A disadvantage of this estimator is that it 
requires  the  a  priori  specification  of  a  weighting  matrix.  Conley  (1999)  and  Conley  and 
Molinari (2005) try to overcome this problem. Their estimator is the standard minimizer of 
the quadratic form in the sample moment condition, where the covariance matrix is obtained 
in  non-parametrically.  Spatial  two-stage-least-squares  can  be  used  to  overcome  the 
endogeneity of the spatially lagged dependent variable.   
 
Data 
Our  data  consists  of  all  transactions  of  farmland  in  The  Netherlands  in  2003.  These 
transaction data are merged with different data-bases containing Geographical Information 
System (GIS) data. These GIS data contain different (spatial) characteristics of the parcels   13 
sold in the transactions. The data used in this study were obtained from several sources. An 
overview of all databases is given in appendix 1. 
The most important data source is the Infogroma database containing information on 
transactions and the location of each parcel sold within a transaction. In total we use 945 
observations of transactions of land, because we could match these with all other data sources 
and because both the seller and the buyer were farmers in these transactions. Characteristics 
of farmers are originating from the “Landbouwtelling”, a database that contains census data of 
all farmers in The Netherlands
3. In total there were 85189 farmers in The Netherlands in 
2003, of whom we know 3793 bought land and 3429 sold land in 2003. We could not use all 
observations,  because  for  most  transactions  only  the  seller  or  the  buyer  was  a  farmer. 
Furthermore,  farmers  were  often  involved  in  more  than  one  transaction.  Also  some 
observations could not be used because we couldn’t match them with other databases. Other 
sources we used were data on parcel registration (BRP)
4, which captures information on the 
exact form, location, rent and crops grown, on all parcels used for agricultural purposes. Data 
on actual land use and zoning plans until 2010 are available from municipal, provincial and 
central governments. Country wide data are available on income and population of areas. The 
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, , where Ri is the Reilly index for parcel i, Popk is the number of 
inhabitants of  “red-area” k and di,k is the distance between parcel i and the k-th “red-area”. A 
red-area is an area that is a concatenation of all neighboring areas that are used for living, 
working, industrial purposes etc. Finally, information on roads and railways are used. All this 
spatial  information  is  used  to  define  spatial  explanatory  variables.  The  more  spatial 
                                                 
3 Only farms that are larger than 3 NGE are included in this census data. 1 NGE represents €1390 of gross value 
added.   
4 This data is collected from all farmers in The Netherlands who are obliged to declare which parcels they own 
or rent due to the manure legislation.     14 
information is directly taken into account, the smaller the potential omitted variable bias and 
the smaller the spatial dependence among the errors, because spatial dependence is often due 
to omitted variables. 
  The variables included in the hedonic pricing model (including market and bargaining 
power variables) are provided in table 2.  
 
Table 2: Variables included in hedonic pricing model, number of observations = 945 
Variable  Database nr*  Mean  SD  Min  Max 
Dependent variable           
Transaction price per ha (€10.000)  1  3.9471  4.7027  0.1116  85.1100 
Market power indicators           
N1 = Measure 1   2  -0.0096  0.1861    -0.7646  0.7462 
N2 = Measure 2   2  -0.0499  0.1646  -0.6364  1.0000 
N3 = Measure 3   2  -0.0622  0.6794    -6.4957  5.8790 
N4 = Measure 4   2  -0.0935  0.1151    -0.7054  1.0000 
Bargaining power indicators           
Kids
buy (=1 if buyer has kids aged above 15, 0 otherwise)  2  0.0233  0.1509  0.0000  1.0000 
Kids
sell (=1 if seller has kids aged above 15, 0 otherwise)  2  0.1312  0.3378  0.0000  1.0000 
Sex
buy (=1 if farm operator at buyers farm is a male, 0 
otherwise) 
2  0.9333  0.2496  0.0000  1.0000 
Sex
sell (=1 if farm operator at seller farm is a male, 0 
otherwise) 
2  0.9291  0.2568  0.0000  1.0000 
Age
buy (age of oldest farm operator at buyers farm)   2  50.9005  11.1176  24.0000  84.0000 
Age
sell (age of oldest farm operator at sellers farm)  2  53.8921  11.7669  23.0000  95.0000 
Inc
buy (income proxy (total NGE’s) for buyer)  2  215.9215  467.6663  3.3700  5024.0400 
Inc
sell (income proxy (total NGE’s) for seller)  2  76.1911  134.5293  3.0600  2179.1000 
Personal
buy (=1 if farm of buyer is a personal enterprise, 
0 otherwise) 
2  0.1270  0.3331  0.0000  1.0000   15 
Personal
sell (=1 if farm of seller is a personal enterprise, 0 
otherwise) 
2  0.0561  0.2302  0.0000  1.0000 
Land quality indicators           
Parcel size (ha)  3  3.3312  2.8863  0.1265  26.6949 
Parcel shape (Minimum perimeter/actual perimeter  
=(4*square root(parcel size))/perimeter 
3  0.0056  0.0027  0.0014  0.0282 
Indicators about rights and restrictions            
Land is rented (=1, otherwise 0)   1  0.0434  0.2038  0.0000  1.0000 
Current land use indicators           
Distance to nearest living area (km)  4  1.2815  0.8803  0.0026  0.7923 
Distance to nearest industrial park (km)  4  1.9792  1.1917  0.0284  8.8318 
Distance to nearest airport (km)  4  15.4055  7.8156  0.2182  44.0462 
Distance to nearest recreational zone (km)  4  1.1882  0.7037  0.0402  6.0521 
Distance to nearest nature (km)  4  0.6758  0.7459  0.0072  7.4252 
Distance to nearest wet nature (km)  4  3.6358  2.8374  0.0711  2.0212 
Distance to nearest glasshouse horticulture  (km)  4  7.2994  7.1165  0.0206  43.0578 
Distance to nearest salt water  (km)  5  70.7615  40.0439  0.1581  149.7852 
Distance to nearest fresh water (km)  5  1.0733  0.7811  0.0230  4.5256 
Distance to nearest highways (km)  9  6.6572  5.1065  0.0577  28.8492 
Zoning indicators           
Smallest  distance  to  Ecological  Main  Structure  (EHS) 
(this zone also partly consists of current land used for 
nature purposes) (km) 
8  1.0316  1.2985  0.0016  9.0354 
Future roads and railroads (1 if parcel is located within 
the indicated area, 0 otherwise) 
7  0.0011  0.0325  0.0000  1.0000 
Future fresh water (extra space for rivers, 1 if parcel is 
located within the indicated area, 0 otherwise) 
8  0.0656  0.2477  0.0000  1.0000 
Future  living  area  (1  if  parcel  is  located  within  the 
indicated area, 0 otherwise) 
7  0.0127  0.1120  0.0000  1.0000 
Future  working  area  (1  if  parcel  is  located  within  the  7  0.0053  0.0726  0.0000  1.0000   16 
indicated area, 0 otherwise) 
Neighborhood characteristics           
Population Density (number of 100 inhabitants / square 
km) 
6  3.1559  3.2433  0.6000  44.6500 
Average  disposable  yearly  income  within  the 
municipality (in €10.000) 
6  1.2237  0.0805  1.0500  1.6200 
Other variables           
Reilly index   4,6  0.0099  0.0763  0.0008  2.3473 
Buyer and seller are family (=1, otherwise = 0)  1  0.1185  0.3234  0.0000  1.0000 
*For the description of the database see appendix 1. The number in this column refers to appendix 1.  
 
Empirical results 
The  ordinary  least-squares  (OLS)  regression  results  of  the  hedonic  pricing  function  are 
reported in table 3. This model assumes no spatial lag or error dependence. Furthermore, 
market and bargaining power are only allowed for in case there is no family relationship 
between the buyer and seller. A number of aspects of the estimates are worth noting. First, 
about 47% of the variation in the sales prices of agricultural land can be explained by the 
model. Second, all significant coefficients have the expected signs.  
 
Table 3. OLS results of the hedonic pricing function of the agricultural land market 
Dependent variable: Price per ha (€10000)  Coefficient  t-statistic  Marginal 
effect  
N if seller and buyer are not family, 0 otherwise  -3.1639**  -2.61   
Kids
buy if seller and buyer are not family, 0 otherwise  0.5506     0.64      
Kids
sell if seller and buyer are not family, 0 otherwise  0.3605  0.92   
Sex
buy if seller and buyer are not family, 0 otherwise  -0.9344*     -1.88      
Sex
sell if seller and buyer are not family, 0 otherwise  0.2765  0.56      
Age
buy if seller and buyer are not family, 0 otherwise   -0.0235**  -2.03     17 
Age
sell if seller and buyer are not family, 0 otherwise  -0.0231**  -2.08      
Inc
buy if seller and buyer are not family, 0 otherwise  -0.0008**  -2.60   
Inc
sell if seller and buyer are not family, 0 otherwise  0.0003  0.37      
Personal
buy if seller and buyer are not family, 0 otherwise  2.5965**  5.98      
Personal
sell if seller and buyer are not family, 0 otherwise  2.8671**  5.00      
Parcel size  0.1349**  2.51   
Parcel shape  84.4751  1.51      
Land is rented (=1, 0 otherwise)  -2.0375**  -3.59   
1 / distance to nearest living area (km)  0.0205**  2.21  -0.0125 
1 / distance to nearest industrial park (km)  0.0834  1.15  -0.0213 
1 / distance to nearest airport (km)  0.0797  0.16  -0.0003 
1 / distance to nearest recreational area (km)  0.1697**  2.93  -0.1202 
1 / distance to nearest wet nature (km)  -2.0582*  -1.73  0.1557 
1 / distance to nearest glasshouse horticulture (km)  0.1590**  4.77  -0.0030 
1 / distance to nearest salt water (km)  0.2949  0.85  -0.0001 
1 / distance to nearest fresh water (km)  -0.0636*  -1.81  0.0552 
1 / distance to nearest highway (km)  -0.0255  -0.26  0.0006 
1 / dist. to nearest nature or Ecological Main Structure (EHS) (km)  -0.0041  -0.82  0.0185 
Future roads and railroads  -1.8016  -0.51   
Future fresh water  0.1598  0.33   
Future living area  0.0010  0.00   
Future working area  4.9695**  3.07   
Reilly index  31.7077**  19.78   
Population density  0.1636**  4.24   
Average income within the municipality  3.4476**  2.23   
Buyer and seller are family (=1, 0 otherwise)  -3.7828**  -3.39   
Constant  0.2949  0.13   
R-squared  0.4726     
Adjusted R-squared  0.4541     
Number of observations  945       18 
**significant at 95% reliability level. *significant at 90% reliability level.    
 
The parameter for market power is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level and 
has the expected negative sign. We expected a negative sign because N increases when the 
relative number of sellers increases compared to the relative number of buyers. In case there 
are more sellers relative to the number of buyers, sellers have relatively less bargaining power 
and sales prices decrease. So, local market power is an important element in explaining land 
prices
5.  
With respect to bargaining power, six out of ten parameters of variables accounting for 
bargaining power are significantly differently from zero. So, besides market power effects 
there is also evidence for bargaining power effects on agricultural land prices. However, we 
find no evidence for symmetry as assumed by Harding et al. (2003) for those coefficients that 
are statistically significant. For example, if we consider the age of the oldest farm operator, 
we expect age to be positively correlated with bargaining power and therefore a negative sign 
for buying farmers and a positive sign for age of selling farmers. However, for the latter we 
obtained a significant negative sign, violating symmetry. The negative sign can be explained 
from the fact that some older potential sellers like to sell their land because of retirement, so 
they might bargain less over prices and accept a lower price for their land. For the bargaining 
power variables that deal with the size of the farms we also don’t find symmetry. Farm size of 
buyers in terms of NGE (Inc
Buy) has a negative impact on the price per ha, as expected, but 
number of NGE’s is not significant for sellers. For the second size indicator, Personal
j, both 
parameters for buyers and sellers are significant and positive, clearly violating symmetry in 
bargaining. Personal enterprises are usually associated with smaller farms. If the buyer is a 
                                                 
5 We also defined three other proxy variables for market power and used them in estimation instead of the above 
specification. Two of these alternative measures approximated the number of potential buyers by summing up 
predicted probabilities of buying land obtained from a probit model. The three alternative proxies gave rather 
similar estimation results as those obtained with the above specification.     19 
personal enterprise, indeed a higher land price is paid. However, the parameter for sellers is 
also positive. What may play a role here is the number of hectares and parcels sold. In case 
the seller is not a personal enterprise, it can be expected to be a large farm, which may sell 
more land and more parcels, which is negative for the bargaining power of the seller, resulting 
in the positive sign for personal enterprise. For gender, we might expect symmetric bargaining 
power, but there is not much variation in this variable, because most farm operators are men, 
explaining  why  gender  of  sellers  is  not  significant  and  why  gender  of  buyers  is  only 
significant at the 90% level. Furthermore, the variables kids
 j are correlated with the age of the 
farm operator, so this explains why these variables are not significant.  
  An  important  significant  variable  in  the  model  is  the  Reilly  index,  which  is  an 
indicator of the urbanization of an area. Parcels located within highly urbanized areas are 
priced  much  higher.  Also  variables  like  population  density  and  average  income  in  the 
municipality are indicators of the urbanization. Both variables have significant parameters and 
have a positive influence on prices. 
Furthermore,  some  land  use  indicators  are  included  in  the  model  in  the  form  of 
distances to the nearest area with a certain type of land use. Since we expect the effect of 
these  variables  to  diminish  when  distance  increases,  we  included  1/distance  instead  of 
distance itself. Because of this transformation, we also provide the marginal effects around the 
means of changes in distance itself in table 3. For example, if the distance between a parcel 
and its nearest living area would increase with 1 km, this would mean a price reduction of 
€125,- per ha. on average. Also prices increase by €1202,- on average when the land is 1 km 
closer to a recreational area. For farmers close to recreational areas it is easier to start up 
additional non-agricultural activities on their land. Furthermore, wet nature close by has a 
negative impact on prices, due to the high water level in those areas, glasshouse horticulture 
has a positive impact, due to a zoning effect, because glasshouse horticulture is not allowed   20 
everywhere  in  the  Netherlands.  Last,  fresh  water  located  nearby  has  a  negative  impact, 
probably due to higher water levels and higher chances of flooding in these areas. If the 
transacted plot is within an area that is denoted as a future working area, it increases the price 
by about €50000.    
As  mentioned before, the model is estimated using OLS, whereas usually there is 
spatial lag and error dependence in hedonic pricing models. Table 4 shows test results of 
several statistics that test for spatial lag and error dependence. These tests show that there is 
no evidence for any of these types of dependence in our model at a 95% reliability level. 
What we do observe is that at a 90% reliability level none of the tests with pre-specified 
weighting matrices is significant. Only the Kelejian and Robinson-statistic, which doesn’t 
depend upon a pre-specified weighting matrix suggests spatial autocorrelation at the 90% 
confidence level if parcels are located within 1 km of each other. For larger distances, this KR 
test statistic also suggests absence of spatial error dependence. We conclude from these tests 
that it is correct to use an OLS model to estimate the hedonic price function for agricultural 
land in the Netherlands since spatial lag dependence and spatial error dependence are absent 
in this model specification. 
 
Table 4: Test statistics spatial lag and spatial error dependence 
  W = 1 / d  W = 1 / d
2  Wij = 1 if distance < 
1 km, 0 otherwise 
Spatio temporal lower 
triangular matrix based 
on 1 / d 
Test for spatial lag dependence 
SARMA  2.0805  2.2452  2.1600  0.7687 
Prob SARMA  0.3534  0.3254  0.3396  0.6809 
Tests for spatial error dependence 
Moran I  -0.0115  -0.0407  -0.0410  -0.0079   21 
Prob Moran I  0.9908  0.9676  0.9673  0.9937 
LM err  1.5165  1.6212  1.5895  0.7616 
Prob LM err  0.2181  0.2029  0.2074  0.3828 
         
  Max 1 km     Max 5 km     Max 10 km  Max 20 km 
KR  26.1983*  20.9119  17.5310  0.8589 
Prob KR  0.0513  0.1819  0.3521  1.0000 
**significant at 95% reliability level. *significant at 90% reliability level.  
 
 
Conclusions and recommendations 
In  this  paper  we  find  evidence  for  market  power  in local  agricultural  land  markets.  This 
means that there is no perfect competition in the agricultural land market and prices deviate 
from  competitive  market  prices  due  to  the  existence  of  excess  surpluses.  Also  we  find 
evidence for bargaining power. This means that sellers and buyers bargain over the excess 
surplus and that the final transaction price resulting from the negotiations depends on the 
characteristics  of  the  buyer  and  seller  involved  in  bargaining.  This  has  important 
consequences for subsequent work that uses hedonic pricing techniques to model real estate 
prices. Ignoring local market power and bargaining effects may lead to omitted variable bias 
on estimated shadow prices in hedonic pricing models.  
  Besides  market  power  and  bargaining,  agricultural  land  prices  are  also  largely 
dependent upon the degree of urbanization in the surrounding areas. For a densely populated 
country like the Netherlands this could of course be expected. Although all land considered in 
this paper is used for agricultural purposes, speculation seems to play an important role in 
determining prices for agricultural land. 
  Further research is needed to determine whether or not the conclusion of no error- 
dependence  is  justified.  To  do  this  the  model  can  be  estimated  using  the  GMM  method   22 
suggested by Conley (1999) and Conley and Molinari (2005). This method does not require a 
pre  specified  weighting  matrix.  All  test-measures  that  require  a  pre  specification  were 
insignificant. This might point to the fact that all four measures of the weighting matrix were 
not well specified.  
  The current model does not contain indicators for the quality of land. These are hard to 
determine,  because  the  quality  depends  on  a  combination  of  factors,  e.g.  soil  type  and 
groundwater level. Whether these characteristics have positive or negative impact depends on 
the crops grown on these parcels. So, in order to include a land quality indicator we have to 
combine several characteristics in one quality measure. With respect to model specification, 
further research is also needed on the land use variables. At this moment all measures were 
specified in the nearest distance to certain kinds of land use. However, measures specified as 
percentage of a certain type of land use within a buffer zone around a parcel of 1 km might be 
a better measure.  
  Another issue that deserves our attention is which observations to include in the model 
and which ones not to include? Although both buyers and sellers in our model are farmers, it 
is strange that farmers are willing to pay amounts of over €100000,- for agricultural land. This 
may involve speculation. On the one hand the agricultural land market is related to other land 
markets and you will always find evidence of speculation in the prices. But we did exclude 
transactions with prices over €1000000,- because of this reason. So the question is which 
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Appendix 1  
 
Table A1: Databases used in this research 
Nr  Name database  Data source  Year data 
1  Infogroma   Government  Services  for  Land  and  Water 
Management (DLG) 
2003 
2  Landbouwtelling  Government Services for Regulations  2003 
3  Parcel Registration (BRP)  Government Services for Regulations  2004 
4  Land Use Statistics  Statistics Netherlands (CBS)  2000 
5  Spatial land use mapping (LGN)-4  Wageningen UR - Alterra  1999-2000 
6  District  and  Neighborhood 
Information 
Statistics Netherlands (CBS)  2003 
7  The  New  Map  of  The  Netherlands 
(NKN) 
Corporation  of  the  New  Map  of  The 
Netherlands  
2002 
8  Note about Spatial Allocation  Ministry  of  Housing,  Spatial  Planning  and 
the Environment 
2004 
9  National Roadmap (NWB)  Ministry  of  Transport,  Public  Works  and 
Water Management 
2003 
 
 